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or two of war must ruin her completely. Yet she maintains a firm front in the midst of her reverses and misfortunes, and perhaps holds, at this critical moment, the destinies of the European continent in her hands.

PIETY OF WAR!—It would be amusing enough, if it were not so revolting, to observe how even Christian men, who assume the rightfulness of the military profession, talk about the professional warriors, who hire themselves out to governments as jobbers in the work of human butchery, and hold themselves ready to kill, and plunder, and burn at the will of their employers. Take a specimen from the very last number (22d June) of an *Orthodox* journal in the city of the Pilgrims:—

“A DELIGHTFUL FACT.—It is stated on good authority, that there are 305 military officers in the present Eastern expedition, who are bound together in solemn concert and communion, that they will remember and pray for each other once a week, and also that on the eve of battle, and, if possible, in the very raging of the battle, they will lift up their hearts to God in peace and love to protect and shelter each other. In the naval service are 310 similarly bound to God, their country, and one another. May the Hearer of prayer throw his shield over them, and give them the victory over Nicholas and the Devil, with all their subordinate angels of death!”

Now, just conceive, if you can, a form of prayer for these warriors in accordance with the Sermon on the Mount, the Lord's Prayer, or the 12th chapter of Romans! Put the real idea into an *appropriate* petition to the Father of all, to the God of peace, and the bold, startling blasphemy of the thing would make your blood curdle. We may suppose the fighters from Russia as honest, perhaps as devout, as those from England; but what sort of prayer would his Grace of Canterbury, or the Greek Patriarch at St. Petersburg, prepare for those men of blood against each other? The Liturgy of War! what *can* it be but imprecations of wrath and vengeance? Suppose the pirates now in the Mediterranean,—and pirates *have* been devout after *their* fashion, just as warriors are after theirs,—or a fleet of slave-ships on the coast of Africa, like that devout slave-trader of the last century, John Newton, who kept his religious diary for years while commanding such a ship, to agree as piously as these 615 military officers are said to have done, that they would “in solemn concert and communion pray for each other once a week, on the eve of battle, and in the very raging of the battle.” Is not the idea about as Christian in one case as the other? If not, where is the difference, and the grounds of it?

JOHN BRIGHT ON THE TURKISH WAR.

This eloquent Quaker, in his Speech in the House of Commons, March 31, gave the views entertained of the present war by most of the peace men in England. We give a few extracts:—

THREE METHODS.—There have been three plans for dealing with this Turkish question, advocated by as many parties in this country. The first finds favor with two or three gentlemen who usually sit on the bench below me, with a considerable number out of doors, and with a portion of the public press. These persons were anxious to have gone to war during last summer. They seemed actuated by a frantic and bitter hostility to Russia; and, without considering the calamities in which they might involve this

country, they have sought to urge it into a great war, as they imagined, on behalf of European freedom, and in order to cripple the resources of Russia. I need hardly say that I have not a particle of sympathy with that party, or with that policy.—I think nothing can be more unwise than that party, and nothing more atrocious than their policy. But there was another course recommended, and which the Government has followed. War delayed, but still certain—arrangements made which placed the issue of war in other hands than in those of the Government of this country—that is the policy which the Government has pursued, and in my opinion it is fatal to Turkey, and disastrous to England.—There is a third course, and which I should have, and indeed have all along recommended—that war should have been avoided by the acceptance on the part of Turkey either of the last note of Prince Menschikoff, or of the Vienna Note; or, if Turkey would not consent to either, that then she should have been allowed to enter into the war alone, and England and France,—supposing they had taken, and continued to take, the same view of the interests of Western Europe which they have hitherto taken—might have stood aloof until the time when there appeared some evident danger of the war being settled on terms destructive of the balance of power; and then they might have come in, and have insisted on a different settlement. I would either have allowed or compelled Turkey to yield, or would have insisted on her carrying on the war alone.

BALANCE-OF-POWER ARGUMENT.—“The ‘balance of power,’—a term not easy to define. It is a hacknied term; a phrase to which it is difficult to attach any definite meaning. I wish the noble Lord would explain what is meant by the balance of power. In 1791, the whole Whig party repudiated the proposition that Turkey had anything to do with the balance of power. Mr. Burke, in 1791, when speaking on that subject, said, ‘I have never heard it said before, that the Turkish empire was ever considered as any part of the balance of power in Europe. They have nothing to do with European policy; they consider themselves as wholly Asiatic. What have these worse than savages to do with the Powers of Europe, but to spread war, destruction and pestilence among them? The Ministry and the policy which would give these people any weight in Europe, would deserve all the bans and curses of posterity. All that is holy in religion, all that is moral and humane, demand an abhorrence of everything which tends to extend the power of that cruel and wasteful empire. Any Christian Power is to be preferred to these destructive savages.’ Mr. Whitbread, on the same occasion, said, ‘Suppose the Empress at Constantinople, and the Turks expelled from the European provinces, will any unprejudiced man contend that by such an event mankind would not be largely benefited? Will any man contend that the expulsion of a race of beings whose abominable tyranny proscribes the arts, and literature, and everything that is good, and great, and amiable, would not conduce to the prosperity and happiness of the world? I am convinced it would. This is an event with which the paltry consideration of the nice adjustment of the balance in Europe is not to be put in competition, although I am a friend to that balance on broad and liberal principles.’ ‘God forbid,’ said Lord Holland in 1828, ‘I ever should see—for the proposition would be scouted from one end of England to the other—any preparations or any attempt to defend this our ancient ally (Turkey) from the attacks of its enemies. There was no arrangement made in that treaty for preserving the crumbling and hateful, or, as Mr. Burke called it, that wasteful and disgusting empire of the Turks, from dismemberment and destruction; and none of the Powers who were parties to that treaty, will ever, I hope, save the falling empire of Turkey from ruin.’

This ‘balance of power’ is, in reality, the hinge on which this whole question turns. But if that is so important as to be worth a sanguinary war,

why did you not go to war with France when she seized upon Algiers? That was a portion of Turkey not quite so distinct, it is true, as are the Danubian Principalities; but still Turkey had sovereign rights over Algiers. When, therefore, France seized on a large portion of the Northern Coast of Africa, might it not have been said that such an act tended to convert the Mediterranean into a French lake, that Algiers lay next to Tunis, and that having conquered Tunis, there would remain only Tripoli between France and Alexandria, and that the 'balance of power' was being destroyed by the aggrandisement of France? All this might have been said, and the Government might easily have plunged the country into war on that question. But happily the Government of that day had the good sense not to resist, and the result has not been disadvantageous to Europe; this country has not suffered from the seizure of Algiers, and England and France have continued at peace. Take another case—the case of the United States. The United States waged war with Mexico,—a war with a weaker State,—in my opinion an unjust and unnecessary war. If I had been a citizen of the American Republic, I should have condemned that war; but might it not have been as justly argued that, if we allowed the aggressive attacks of the United States upon Mexico, her insatiable appetite would soon be turned towards the North,—towards the dependencies of this Empire,—and that the magnificent Colonies of the Canadas would soon fall a prey to the assaults of their rapacious neighbor? But such arguments were not used, and it was not thought necessary to involve this country in a war for the support of Mexico, although the Power that was attacking that country lay adjacent to our own dominions.

If this phrase of the 'balance of power' is to be always an argument for war, the pretence for war will never be wanting, and peace can never be secure. Let any one compare the power of this country with that of Austria now, and forty years ago. Will any one say that England, compared with Austria, is not now three times as powerful as she was thirty or forty years ago? Austria has a divided people, bankrupt finances, and her credit is so low, that she cannot borrow a shilling out of her own territories; England has a united people, national wealth rapidly increasing, and a mechanical and productive power to which that of Austria is as nothing. Might not Austria complain that we have disturbed the 'balance of power,' because we are growing so much stronger from better Government, from the greater union of our people, from the wealth that is created by the hard labor and skill of our population, and from the wonderful development of the mechanical resources of the kingdom, which is seen on every side? If this phrase of the 'balance of power,' the meaning of which no nobody can exactly make out, is to be brought in on every occasion, to stimulate this country to war, there is an end to all hope of permanent peace. This whole idea is a mischievous delusion which has come down to us from past times; we ought to drive it from our minds, and to consider the solemn question of peace or war on more clear, more definite and far higher principles than any that are involved in the phrase, 'the balance of power.'

THE THREE OBJECTS OF THE WAR. — 1. To maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. 2. To curb the aggressive power of Russia. 3. To defend the interests of Great Britain.

1. What is the condition of this Empire at this moment? There are no less than three foreign armies on Turkish soil: there are 100,000 Russian troops in Bulgaria; there are armies from England and France approaching the Dardanelles, to entrench themselves on Turkish territory, and to return nobody knows when. All this can hardly contribute to the 'independence' of any country. But, more than this, there are insurrections springing up in almost every Turkish province, and insurrections which must, from the

nature of the Turkish Government, widely extend; and it is impossible to describe the anarchy which must prevail, inasmuch as the control heretofore exercised by the Government to keep the peace is now gone, by the withdrawal of its troops to the banks of the Danube; and the license and demoralization engendered by ages of bad government, will be altogether unchecked. In addition to these complicated horrors, there are 200,000 men under arms; the state of their finances is already past recovery; and the allies of Turkey are making demands upon her far beyond anything that was required by Russia herself. Can anything be more destructive of the 'integrity and independence' of Turkey than the policy of the Noble Lord?

2. But we are undertaking to repress and to curb Russian aggression. These are catching words; they have been amplified in newspapers, and have served to blind the eyes of multitudes wholly ignorant of the details of this question. If Turkey had been in danger from the side of Russia heretofore, will she not be in far greater danger when the war is over? Russia is always there. You do not propose to dismember Russia, or to blot out her name from the map, and her history from the records of Europe. Russia will be always there — always powerful, always watchful, and actuated by the same motives of ambition, either of influence or of territory, which are supposed to have moved her in past times. What then do you propose to do? and how is Turkey to be secured? Will you make a treaty with Russia, and force conditions upon her? But if so, what security have you that one treaty will be more binding than another? It is easy to find or make a reason for breaking a treaty, when it is the interest of a country to break it. If Russia is still powerful and ambitious, as she certainly will be, and, if Turkey is exhausted and enfeebled by the war, as she certainly will be, then I want to know what guarantee you have, the moment the resources of Russia have recovered from the utmost degree of humiliation and exhaustion to which you may succeed in reducing her, that she will not again insist on terms with Turkey infinitely more perilous than those you have now ruined Turkey by urging her to refuse? It is a delusion to suppose you can dismember Russia — that you can blot her from the map of Europe — that you can take guarantees from her, as some seem to imagine, as easily as you take bail from an offender who would otherwise go to prison for three months. England and France cannot do this with a stroke of the pen, and the sword will equally fail, if the attempt be made.

3. But I come now to another point. How are the interests of England involved in this question? This is, after all, the great matter which we, the representatives of the people of England, have to consider. It is not a question of sympathy with any other state. I have sympathy with Turkey; I have sympathy with the serfs of Russia; I have sympathy with the people of Hungary, whose envoy the noble Lord, the Member for Tiverton, refused to see, and the overthrow of whose struggle for freedom by the armies of Russia he needlessly justified in this House; I have sympathy with the Italians, subjects of Austria, Naples, and the Pope; I have sympathy with the three millions of slaves in the United States; but it is not for a question of sympathy that I dare involve this country, or any country, in a war which must cost an incalculable amount of treasure and of blood. It is not my duty to make this country the knight-errant of the human race, and to take upon herself the protection of the thousand millions of human beings who have been permitted by the Creator of all things to people this planet. I hope no one will assume that I would invite — that is the phrase which has been used — the aggressions of Russia. If I were a Russian, speaking in a Russian Parliament, I should denounce any aggression upon Turkey, as I now blame the policy of our own Government; and I greatly fear I should find myself in a minority, as I now find myself in a minority on this question. But it has never yet been explained how the interests of this country

are involved in the present dispute. We are not going to fight for tariffs, or for markets for our exports. In 1791, Mr. Grey argued that, as our imports from Russia exceeded one million sterling, it was not desirable that we should go to war with a country trading with us to that amount. In 1853, Russia exported to this country at least fourteen millions sterling; and that fact affords no proof of the increasing barbarism of Russia, or of any disregard of her own interests as respects the development of her resources. With regard to trade, I can speak with some authority as to the state of things in Lancashire. The Russian trade is not only at an end, but it is made an offence against the law to deal with our customers in Russia. The German-trade is most injuriously affected by the uncertainty which prevails on the continent of Europe. The Levant trade, a very important branch, is almost extinguished in the present state of affairs in Greece, Turkey in Europe, and Syria. All property in trade is diminishing in value, whilst its burdens are increasing. The funds have fallen in value to the amount of about 120 millions sterling, and railway property is quoted at about 80 millions less than was the case a year ago.

POPULARITY OF THE WAR.—I am told indeed that the war is popular, and that it is foolish and eccentric to oppose it. I doubt if the war be very popular in this House. But as to what is, or has been popular, I may ask, what was more popular than the American war? There were persons lately living in Manchester who had seen the recruiting party going through the principal streets of that city, accompanied by the parochial clergy in full canonicals, exhorting the people to enlist to put down the rebels in the American colonies. Where is now the popularity of that disastrous and disgraceful war, and who is the man to defend it?

EFFECTS OF THE WAR ON ENGLAND.—The past events of our history have taught me, that the intervention of this country in European wars is not only unnecessary, but calamitous; that we have rarely come out of such intervention having succeeded in the objects we fought for; that a debt of £800,000,000 sterling has been incurred by the policy which the noble Lord approves, apparently for no other reason than that it dates from the time of William III.; and that, not debt alone has been incurred, but that we have left Europe at least as much in chains as before a single effort was made by us to rescue her from tyranny. I believe if this country, seventy years ago, had adopted the principle of non-intervention in every case where her interests were not directly and obviously assailed, she would have been saved from much of the pauperism and brutal crimes by which our government and people have alike been disgraced. This country might have been a garden, every dwelling might have been of marble, and every person who treads its soil might have been sufficiently educated.

LONDON PEACE SOCIETY'S ANNIVERSARY.

The report of this Society's anniversary proceedings, May 23, we received too late for any thing more than a brief account, and a few extracts as specimens of their exalted aim and spirit. The President, CHARLES HINDLEY, M. P., opened the meeting with a pertinent and forcible address; the Report, a luminous exposition of what the Society had done during the year, was read by its able and accomplished Secretary, Rev. HENRY RICHARD; and speeches of much pith and point were made on resolu-